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Pensions and Gender Equality 
Policy paper for the Commission on a Gender-Equal Economy 
Jonquil Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Personal Finance, The Open University 
January 2020 
Disclaimer: This paper was commissioned by the Women’s Budget Group to inform the Commission 
on a Gender-Equal Economy. An input to the Commission, it has been written by an independent 
author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Commission on a Gender-Equal 
Economy or the Women’s Budget Group. 
Executive summary 
Due to their much greater likelihood of taking on unpaid care responsibilities, women face 
disadvantages in the labour market compared to men. Not only does this result in a gender pay gap 
of around 17% in the UK during women’s working lives but an even larger gender pension gap in 
retirement of 36%. While part of any long-term solution to this gender inequality would address the 
labour-market disadvantages, there is no inevitable association between a pay gap and a pension 
gap. The design of pension systems can offset, perpetuate or exacerbate the inequality. 
The new UK state pension system is more gender equal than the pre-2016 state system and a major 
strength of both systems is the protection of carers’ pension rights since 1978. However, transitional 
rules mean that it will be another 20 years before women receive the same state pensions as men.  
Moreover, while the government considers the new state pension to be enough to live on, it is 
around 40% lower than the level deemed adequate by independent sources.  
The UK private pension system is highly unequal with the capacity to save and the associated tax 
reliefs heavily skewed towards men. As a result, the median pension wealth of women on the brink 
of retirement is just half that of men. The cost of pension tax reliefs in UK was £35.4 billion in 2017-
18. This compared with public spending on state pensions of about £94 billion (Great Britain). 
All pensions, however financed or calculated, are claims on future national income and so, to the 
extent that these claims are met, involve a transfer of national income from the working population 
to the retired population. The most economically efficient way to ensure equal, adequate and 
reliable retirement incomes for women and men would be to replace the current patchy 
recognition of unpaid work and lottery of ability to save inherent in the current state and private 
pension systems with a state-funded universal basic income (UBI) for all retired people payable at 
a level of around £277 a week (£14,400 a year)1. With an adequate retirement UBI, any additional 
provision for retirement would be a matter of personal choice with no need or justification for 
subsidies from taxpayers. Assuming the private pension tax relief saved was diverted to help fund 
UBI, as a percentage of GDP, the cost would be less than the current OECD average of public 
expenditure on pensions.  
There is, in any case, a lack of evidence to suggest that pension tax reliefs are effective at 
incentivising saving for retirement and the UK system of reliefs is highly regressive. In the absence of 
 
1 To cover adequate living costs; care needs – which vary greatly from one person to the next – would need to be funded separately. See 






a retirement UBI, pension tax reliefs should still be scrapped and the amount used to finance 
state-funded carer credits to private pension schemes. 
Background 
There are two main aims of pension systems: poverty alleviation in older age; and smoothing 
consumption over the life course2. Broadly speaking, there are two bases for achieving this: defined 
benefit, where a set amount of pension is promised and calculated according to some formula, 
typically linked to number of years contributing to a scheme; and defined contribution, where each 
individual builds up their own pot of savings and the eventual pension that will support is unknown. 
Regardless of the basis, there are two ways of financing the provision: pay-as-you-go, where there is 
a direct transfer of resources from current workers to people who are currently retired; and funded 
schemes, where contributions are invested while people are working and the resulting investment 
fund is used to provide their pension when retired. 
An ageing population, due to the ‘baby boom’ generation (born mid-1940s to mid-1960s) reaching 
retirement, and increased longevity at least to the mid-2010s, has put pressure on the UK pension 
system. As a result, there is a good deal of rhetoric about the affordability of defined-benefit 
schemes (which, in the UK, embraces the state pension scheme and some occupational schemes) 
and the pay-as-you-go model (which applies to the state scheme and most public-sector 
occupational schemes). However, all pension rights and savings, whatever their basis and however 
they are financed, are claims on future output3 (for convenience this paper will refer to this as gross 
domestic product, GDP, but private pensions if invested abroad could be a claim on the national 
income of other countries, as could state schemes funded by overseas sales of public debt). This 
means that, unless one design is better than another at contributing to the growth of future GDP, 
affordability concerns apply equally to all types of pension provision (including defined contribution 
and funded schemes) and are essentially debates about how much of GDP a society is willing to 
transfer to its non-working population and who bears the inherent risks. Thus, how nations structure 
their pension systems is a matter of political choice. 
The World Bank identifies multiple ‘pillars’ for the structure of pension provision and Table 1 
describes how the UK system maps to these. The summary statistics in Table 1 highlight the unequal 
gender outcomes that the UK system produces. For example, although women make up 54%4 of the 
UK population aged 65 and over, they account for 62% of people receiving Pension Credit, the main 
means-tested benefit for older households on a low income. Below state pension age, women are 
less likely than men to be contributing to a private pension, and only just over half of women are 






2 Holzmann, R. and Hinz, R. (2005) Old age income support in the 21st century 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPENSIONS/Resources/Old_Age_Inc_Supp_Full_En.pdf. 
3 For a discussion of this point, see for example Barr, N. and Diamond, P. (2008) Reforming pensions Oxford, Oxford University Press. 







Table 1 Pension provision in the UK, 2019-2020 
World Bank pillar5 UK system UK coverage 
(number of people) 
0 – universal or means-
tested state benefits 




Post-April 2016: Flat-rate 
state pension 
Pre-April 2016: Basic pension 
and earnings-related pension 
State pensions in payment7: women 
6.9 million; men 5.8 million 
2-mandatory private 
pensions 








(collectively these are called 
‘private pensions’) 
Proportions in 2016-189 – 
• Age 16 to 64 actively contributing: 
women 53%; men 59% 
• Any age with preserved pension: 
women 19%;  men 23% 
• 65 and over with pension in 
payment: women 53%; men 76% 
4-voluntary non-
pension support 
Eg housing wealth; unpaid 
care; continuing paid work 
• Unpaid carers, at least10: women 
3.8 million; men 2.7 million 
• Age 65+ in work11: women 0.5 
million; men 0.7 million 
 
Among those women who do manage to accumulate their own private pensions, the amounts are 
on average significantly lower than men’s. For example, by age 65 to 74, men have twice the private 
pension wealth of women (median value of £261,000 versus £131,000)12.  Up to age 34, women’s 
private pension wealth is higher than men’s but lags sharply after that13 as women take on caring 
roles. This results in time out of work, low-paid part-time working, reduced promotion prospects 
and, from the outset, a tendency towards gender-stereotypical careers that often pay less than the 
 
5 Holzman and Hinz. Op cit. 
6 Department for Work and Pensions (2019) DWP benefits statistical summary, August 2019 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dwp-benefits-statistics-august-2019/dwp-benefits-statistical-summary-august-
2019#pensions. 
7 Department for Work and Pensions (2019) State pension caseload statistics (5% sample) to March 2019 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/dwp-benefits-statistics-november-2019. 
8 Contracting out was an arrangement whereby the costs and risks of providing earnings-related pensions was shared between the state 
and employers, then later with personal pension providers too. The earnings-related state pension was reduced and, in return for a 
reduction or transfer of contributions that would have been paid to the state, the occupational or personal pension scheme would take 
over paying a replacement pension. 
9 ONS (2019) Pension wealth: wealth in Great Britain 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/datasets/pensionwealthwea
lthingreatbritain. 
10 Carers UK (2019) Facts about carers https://www.carersuk.org/images/Facts_about_Carers_2019.pdf based on 2011 census data. 
11 ONS (2019) Employment by detailed occupation and industry by sex and age for Great Britain, UK and constituent countries, 2018 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/adhocs/009974employmentbydet
ailedoccupationandindustrybysexandageforgreatbritainukandconstituentcountries2018. 








work men do. Not only does this create a gender pay gap during working life (17.3% in 201814) but 
persists and balloons into retirement as a gender pension gap, estimated to be 36% in the UK15. 
While part of any long-term solution would be to address women’s disadvantages in the labour 
market16, evidence finds no systematic association between a gender pay gap and a gender pension 
gap17. Labour market conditions make women vulnerable to lower income in retirement, but the 
design of pension systems can offset, perpetuate or exacerbate this vulnerability. 
Key problems the UK pension system poses for gender equality 
Gendered data for single pensioner households18 show that the dominant sources of income in 
retirement are state pensions (and other benefits) and private pensions (occupational and personal), 
but with women being more heavily dependent on the state pension than men – see Table 2. The 
table also shows that the gender pension gap is greater for older women (£111) than younger ones 
(£70 a week). The design of, and changes to, the state and private pension systems contribute to 
these differences.  The data for current pensioners reflect current and past system design. The 
outcomes in retirement for women and men currently of working age will be different, reflecting 
known changes to the system that are still working through and any subsequent amendments. 
Table 2 Mean gross income of pensioner households, 2017-18* 
 Under age 75 Age 75 and over 
Women Men Couples Women Men Couples 
Number (million) 1.3 0.7 2.8 1.8 0.7 1.4 
Gross income £/week £317 £377 £824 £295 £406 £611 
Of which (% of gross income) 
Benefit income (state 
pension and other state 
benefits) 
61% 50% 30% 68% 48% 48% 
Occupational pension 
income 
23% 27% 27% 24% 30% 34% 
Personal pension income 2% 5% 4% 2% 5% 4% 
Investment income 4% 5% 9% 4% 9% 7% 
Earnings income 10% 12% 28% 1% 7% 7% 
Other 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Source: ONS (2019) Pensioner income series, Tables 1.2, 2.9 and 2.5. 
*Unequivalised income at 2017-18 prices. 
 





15 European Parliament (2019) The gender gap in pensions in the EU 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/631033/IPOL_BRI(2019)631033_EN.pdf. 
16 See, for example, the papers presented to the Commission on paid and unpaid work: https://wbg.org.uk/commission/inputs-to-the-
commission/policy-papers-work-paid-and-unpaid/ 
17 Ibid. 






Gender and the design of the UK state pension system 
Prior to 6 April 2016, despite piecemeal reforms, the UK state pension system still reflected the 
original 1948 design which embedded outdated norms that most women would marry and then be 
financially dependent on their husbands. While the new system introduced since 6 April 2016 – see 
Table 3 - is more gender equal (for example, by removing the previous earnings-related element), 
transitional rules mean that it will take until the early 2040s before women’s state pensions will be 
equal to men’s19. The legacy of successive changes is that different cohorts experience very different 
state pensions according to the dates on which they reached or will reach state pension age, as 
Table 3 shows, and current pensioners continue to endure the gender imbalances of the past. 

















part or all of 
which may be 
contracted out to 
private pension 
scheme instead 
90% of working life; 
reduced basic 
pension if less; 10% 
to get any basic 
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Protection/credits 
for carers since 
1978 
Divorced/widowed 
can use partner’s 
contribution 
record to boost 
basic pension 
Widowed may 
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Under the pre-2016 system, the full basic state pension alone is below the level that the government 
deems is the minimum necessary income. The impact of caring roles on women’s earnings means 
 






their own earnings-related state pensions and/or contracted-out pensions are usually substantially 
lower than those of men.  
Under the post-2016 system, the flat-rate has been set at a level that reflects the former basic 
pension and average amount of earnings-related state pension previously paid out; thus the new 
single pension is higher than the previous basic rate and is approximately at the government’s 
deemed minimum subsistence level (at £168.60 a week in 2019-2020). It should be noted that non-
government sources suggest that the minimum income a single pensioner needs for an adequate 
standard of living is a good deal higher at around £277 a week21.  
In 2019, only 44 per cent of new state pension claimants were receiving the full amount22 but care is 
needed in interpreting this figure. Although no gender breakdown is given, it is likely that the 
proportion is higher for women than men. This is because, under the transitional rules, the potential 
full new state pension is reduced by the amount of any contracted-out private pensions built up 
before April 2016. Women are less likely than men to have contracted-out pensions (largely due to 
more working in the public sector where occupational pensions were not contracted out). This 
means women’s new state pension is more likely to already be at or close to the full amount. 
However, women will generally end up with substantially less pension overall, taking account of 
combined state and contracted-out pensions. 
A significant gender-positive strength of the state system, since 1978, is the protection (now in the 
form of contribution credits) for individuals – mostly women – whose earnings are nil or too low to 
generate paid contributions to the state scheme because they are caring for a child/children or an 
adult with a disability.  
A major change in the state scheme has been the equalisation of women’s state pension age with 
that of men over the period 2010 to 2018 and raising of the state pension age for both since then 
(66 by October 2020 with further rises to 68 planned). Prior to 2010, women’s state pension age was 
60, five years younger than that of men. Coupled with women on average living longer than men, 
this could be considered as a gender inequality against men. While working longer can result in 
higher annual retirement incomes23 (by increasing the time available to accumulate pension and 
decreasing the length of retirement), the raising of women’s state pension age has been particularly 
detrimental to some groups, particularly those doing unpaid work, in low-paid work because of past 
or current caring responsibilities or with health issues, who struggle financially to survive the delay 
until their state pension becomes payable. Government data show that over the period 2013 to 
2019, the number of women aged 60 and over claiming out-of-work benefits increased by 27,500 
and incapacity benefits by 132,00024.   
Gender and the UK private pension system 
Table 4, which shows the income distribution of pensioner couples and single pensioners (no gender 
breakdown available), demonstrates the importance of private pensions (including contracted-out 
pensions) in lifting retirement income above a purely subsistence level. Private pensions comprise 
 
20 Gov.uk (2018) Benefit and pension rates 2019/2020 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/792946/Benefit_and_pension_rates
_2019.pdf. 
21 See, for example, https://www.minimumincome.org.uk/. 
22 DWP (2019). Op cit.  
23 Pensions Policy Institute (2016) How do female lifecourses affect retirement? 
https://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/research/research-reports/2016/briefing-note-84-how-do-female-lifecourses-affect-
retirement/. 






occupational pension schemes established by employers and personal pensions which are contracts 
between individuals and pension providers (such as insurance companies) that can however be 
arranged on a group basis through a workplace. 
Table 4 Income distribution of pensioner households, 2017-18* 
 Net income quintiles 
Bottom Next Middle Next Top 
Pensioner couples 
Gross income £/week £292 £430 £557 £759 £1,676 
% of total from private pensions 14% 23% 33% 42% 38% 
% of total from earnings 5% 8% 12% 17% 32% 
% of total from investments 2% 3% 3% 5% 15% 
Single pensioners 
Gross income £/week £150 £231 £287 £365 £670 
% of total from private pensions 8% 16% 20% 29% 43% 
% of total from earnings 1% 2% 2% 4% 14% 
% of total from investments 2% 2% 2% 3% 9% 
Source: ONS (2019) Pensioner income series, Table 4.3. 
*Non-equivalised income after tax but before adjusting for housing costs. 
Occupational pension schemes in the public sector are mostly defined-benefit schemes. Historically, 
these have also been common in the private sector and will continue to be an important part of 
retirement incomes for many years to come. However, over half of private-sector defined-benefit 
occupational schemes are now closed25, being replaced instead with defined-contribution schemes, 
where each member builds up their own personal pot of savings. In a defined benefit scheme, the 
member is promised a specified level of pension and the inherent risks (investment, inflation and 
longevity) are borne by the employer sponsoring the scheme. In defined contribution schemes the 
risks are all borne by the individual. It is not just this distribution of risk that makes defined-benefit 
schemes superior for the recipient. In addition, contributions (from employers and employees) to 
defined-benefit schemes are  substantially higher, for example, with 56 per cent of employers alone 
contributing 15% or more of earnings and employees commonly paying 5-7%, while the combined 
employer-employee amount contributed to defined-contribution schemes is typically 8% or less26. 
The shift to defined-contribution provision and the lower level of contributions inevitably means 
more risky and lower private-sector pensions for future pensioners. Defined-contribution schemes 
also offer less protection for dependants (typically female partners) since survivor benefits in 
 
25 ONS (2019) Occupational pension schemes in the UK 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/pensionssavingsandinvestments/datasets/occu
pationalpensionschemessurvey, Table 4. 
26 ONS (2019) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/workplacepensions/datasets/summaryofpensionresultsannualsurv





retirement are typically an automatic part of defined-benefit schemes but a matter of member 
choice in defined-contribution schemes. 
While the level of pension provision may be falling, the number of people who will have at least 
some private pension is increasing. Between 2012 and 2018, a system of auto‒enrolment was rolled 
out across the UK under which employers must enrol all eligible employees in a workplace pension 
scheme (which can be an occupational or personal scheme), contributing at least a minimum 
amount to the scheme on behalf of each employee who is typically required to contribute as well. 
Employees may opt out if they wish. Automatic‒enrolment was introduced because of low 
participation in private pensions in the private sector under the previous opt-in system; behavioural 
science suggests that individuals tend to go with the default and that changing to a system where 
individuals had to make an active decision to opt out rather than opt in would boost scheme 
membership.  
Auto‒enrolment has proved effective with an overall increase in private-sector workplace pension 
participation of eligible employees from 42% in 2012 to 85% by 201827. From a gender perspective, 
the term ‘eligible employees’ is important. To be covered by auto‒enrolment, an employee must be 
earning at least £10,000 a year (in 2019-20) in that particular employment.  Table 5 shows that 
pension participation rates are particularly low for private-sector part-time workers and that many 
more women than men work part-time.  Part-time work is often low-paid and, even if a woman’s 
total earnings reach £10,000 or more, this may come from multiple jobs, leaving her ineligible for 
auto‒enrolment in any one of them. 
Table 5: Proportion of employees with workplace pensions 
  Male Female 
Public sector  
Full-time 93.1% 93.2% 
Part-time 72.7% 84.2% 
Private sector   
Full-time 82.1% 82.1% 
Part-time 38.5% 47.3% 
Number of jobs (millions)   
Full-time 11.4 7.6 
Part-time 1.9 5.6 
Source: ONS (2019) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Pensions Table 4 and Paid hours worked 
Table 1.9a. 
Public-sector pension participation has traditionally been high, even among part-time workers. With 
women making up 68% of the public sector workforce and 88% of its part-time workforce28, this high 
participation rate and the fact that all public sector schemes are defined-benefit currently benefits 
women. However, this type of well-pensioned employment is at risk as local councils outsource 
 
27 ONS (2019) Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees. Official statistics: 2008 to 2018 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/806513/workplace-pension-
participation-and-saving-trends-2008-2018.pdf. 







services and cut their own workforces29. While the pension rights of employees transferred from the 
public to private sector are protected, this does not apply to the newly employed in outsourcing 
companies. 
It should also be noted that self-employment is increasing, with ‘a notable change in the mix of 
employment among women towards self-employment’30, but these workers are outside the scope of 
automatic enrolment. 
Whether private pensions are provided on a defined-benefit or defined-contribution basis, the vast 
majority link benefits or contributions to earnings. Thus, the UK private pension system favours 
individuals – most often men – who earn the most and earn consistently without career breaks.  
Even a good defined-benefit pension scheme cannot produce a generous pension if the earnings on 
which it is based are low – for example, the 2011 ‘Hutton review’ found that the median pension 
from public-sector schemes was only £5,600 a year31, reflecting the predominance of low-paid and 
part-time jobs in that sector which are largely undertaken by women workers. Additionally, unlike 
the state system, private pension schemes do not normally credit members with pension rights or 
contributions during periods when they are not earning or their earnings are low because of caring 
responsibilities.  
Gender and pension tax relief 
The UK tax system includes a variety of tax reliefs (a mix of deferring tax until retirement and 
complete tax exemption) aimed at encouraging pension saving that are also linked to earnings 
(through the level of contributions made or level of pension wealth accumulating). In 2017-18, the 
value of these reliefs totalled £53.7 billion, reducing to a net figure of £35.4 billion if income tax 
collected on private pensions in payment is deducted32.  Additionally, unused pension wealth can be 
passed on at death free of inheritance tax and often other taxes too. The way the UK system of 
pension tax reliefs works is highly regressive with over two-thirds of the gross reliefs going to higher-
rate and additional-rate taxpayers in 2015-1633. The 40% of taxpayers earning less than £20,000 a 
year accounted for just 7% of the contributions receiving pension tax relief34, with 47% of female 
taxpayers falling into this group compared with 32% of male taxpayers35. Restrictions on relief for 
the highest earners since April 2016 mean that the extent to which additional-rate taxpayers benefit 
will have fallen somewhat. 
Many more women (8 million) than men (3 million) of working age earn too little to pay tax36 and 
often miss out on tax reliefs on contributions if they are in occupational schemes. This is because 
 
29 See for example Paul Blantern, CEO, Northamptonshire County Council in BBC The Bottom Line 18 July 2015 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b05zyyhx. 
30 ONS (2018) Trends in self-employment 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/articles/trendsinselfemploymentin
theuk/2018-02-07. 
31 Independent Public Service Pensions Commission (2011) Final report 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207720/hutton_final_100311.pdf. 
32 HMRC (2019) Cost of pension tax and NIC relief 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/833859/Table_6_Cost_of_Pension_T
ax_and_NICs_Relief__2012-13_to_2017-18_.pdf. 
33 HM Treasury (2015) Strengthening the incentive to save: consultation on pensions tax relief 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/442159/Strengthening_the_incentiv
e_to_save_consultation__print_.pdf. 
34 Thurley, D. (2019) Restricting pension tax relief https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05901#fullreport. 
35 HMRC (2019) Table 3.3: Distribution of mean and median income and tax by age range and gender, 2016-17 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/distribution-of-median-and-mean-income-and-tax-by-age-range-and-gender-2010-to-2011. 
36 ONS (2019) Principal projection – UK population in age groups 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/datasets/tablea21principalproj






many occupational schemes operate a ‘net pay’ system where pension contributions are deducted 
from pay before income tax on the pay is worked out, meaning there is no relief if the individual is 
not a taxpayer. By contrast, most other private pension schemes operate ‘tax relief at source’ where 
even non-taxpayers have relief at the basic rate added to their savings. The net pay system is used 
by public sector schemes and so particularly disadvantages women given that they make up a high 
proportion of public sector employees. 
While the stated purpose of the tax reliefs is to incentivise saving for retirement37, since 2015 a 
policy of ‘freedom and choice’ has meant that individuals who have reached at least age 55 no 
longer need to use their defined-contribution pension savings to provide retirement income and can 
instead, subject to tax charges on three-quarters of the savings, withdraw and use their savings for 
any purpose. While making a mockery of the whole rationale of the tax reliefs, this policy is also 
likely to reduce the security of women who, having taken on the bulk of unpaid caring 
responsibilities, understood that they would share the retirement income being built up by their 
partner but have no control if their partner decides to use the funds in other ways. 
Recommendations for a more gender-equal approach to pensions 
The UK state pension system since 2016 is more gender-equal than in the past and a great strength 
is its incorporation of protection for carers since 1978. However, the UK government typically takes 
a gender-blind approach to private pension provision, incorrectly assuming that if rules are the same 
for men and women, that is sufficient for equality. A genuinely gender-equal approach (often called 
gender mainstreaming) must take account of the different circumstances of women that limit their 
capacity and opportunities to build retirement savings. 
In an ideal world, the underlying cause of those circumstances would be addressed, recognising the 
value of the estimated £1.2 trillion a year of unpaid household services performed in the UK38, in 
large measure by women.39 However, this goal will take a long time to be addressed. In the 
meantime, there are a variety of ways in which the design of the state and private pension systems 
can be altered to offset women’s labour-market disadvantages and directly reduce the gender 
pensions gap. 
A universal basic income for the retired 
Once it is grasped that all pension systems are a claim on future GDP, the obfuscating arguments 
about the affordability of state provision fall away and the true question becomes: what proportion 
of GDP is society willing to transfer to its retired population?  
The most economically efficient and equitable way to ensure an adequate retirement income for 
women and men would be to directly transfer a non-earnings-related pension for all at a level that 
genuinely supports a decent standard of living via the state system. There is no justification for a 
system that provides less to people who do unpaid as opposed to paid work, so this retirement 
income should be provided to citizens on a non-contributory basis. In other words, there should be a 
universal basic income (UBI) for all retired people. Such a system has many advantages:  
 
37 HM Treasury (2015). Op cit. 
38 ONS (2018) Household satellite accounts 2015 and 2016 https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/householdsatelliteaccounts2015and2016.  






• it avoids the leakage of financing for pensions to intermediaries, such as fund managers and 
financial advisers (estimated to cost about 0.38-0.54% depending on scheme type40);  
• it removes the lottery inherent in defined-contribution savings schemes whereby the inherent 
risks mean some individuals end up with more income than they need while others go short. 
Investment risk in particular is likely to increase due to climate change;  
• it provides an adequate income to all regardless of their past earnings;  
• it does not penalise individuals whose paid labour market participation has been reduced by 
caring responsibilities or other factors; and  
• it does not leave women dependent on pension decisions made by their partners.  
If the legacy of transitional rules could be swept away and retirement UBI had in 2018-19 been set at 
the £277 a week41 quoted above, this would imply an increase in government spending on state 
pensions that year from 4.6% of GDP per year42 to 8.8%, reducing to roughly 7% if savings from net 
tax relief on private pensions were used to help finance the UBI. To put this in perspective, data for 
2015 (the most recent year available), public expenditure on old-age and survivor benefits across the 
OECD was 8.0% of GDP on average, with 22 out of 36 countries spending 7% or more of GDP43. The 
main barrier to a retirement UBI is not cost but political will. 
Repurpose pension tax reliefs: private pension carer credits 
Even if the UBI proposal above is not adopted, there is no justification for continuing with pensions 
tax relief in its current form. There is no evidence that the gross £53.7 billion of tax reliefs work, or 
are the best way, to encourage pension saving. While not specifically discussing pension tax reliefs, 
the National Audit Office has previously stated that: ‘HM Treasury and HMRC do not keep track of 
tax reliefs intended to change behaviour, or adequately report to Parliament on whether tax reliefs 
work as expected’44.  In responses to a government consultation, the rather sophisticated (largely 
corporate) respondents suggested that the reliefs offer ‘a strong incentive for them to save into a 
pension rather than put their money elsewhere,’45 which suggests the reliefs do not increase the 
level of retirement saving overall only the channel adopted. In fact, the decision to introduce auto‒
enrolment suggests that the previous reliance on tax incentives alone was not particularly effective 
at stimulating mass-market pension saving; and the success of auto‒enrolment in increasing the 
numbers of people now saving for retirement may mean that the attempt to incentivise through tax 
reliefs is now redundant. 
In addition, the pension tax relief system is regressive and impossible to justify on equity grounds. 
The higher-rate and additional-rate taxpayers who predominantly benefit have both the capacity 
and most likely the motivation to save for their retirement without expensive subsidies from 
taxpayers. While some attempt has been made to rein in the benefit flowing to additional-rate 
taxpayers, the result has been huge complexity and detrimental spill-over effects, such as NHS 
 
40 House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2019) Pension costs and transparency 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/1476/1476.pdf. 
41 https://www.minimumincome.org.uk/. Op cit. 
42 Office for Budget responsibility (2018) Welfare spending: state pension https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/tax-by-tax-spend-by-
spend/welfare-spending-state-pension/. 2018-19 expected state pension spending of 4.4% of GDP was equivalent to 12.7 million people 
receiving an average of £7,610 a year each; an increase to £14,500 a year each for 12.7 million people would be equivalent to 8.8% of GDP. 
43 OECD (2019) Pensions at a glance 2019 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-at-a-glance_19991363, 
Table 8.3. 
44 National Audit Office (2014) The effective management of tax reliefs https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-effective-management-of-tax-
reliefs/. 
45  HM Treasury (2016) Strengthening the incentive to save: summary of responses to the consultation on pensions tax relief  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/508184/summary_of_responses_to_





doctors withdrawing their labour to avoid pension-saving-related tax bills46. The government needs 
to go back to the drawing board and rethink how this public money can be best used and for what 
purpose. 
If there is no switch to an adequate UBI, people will still need to save privately for retirement, but 
the pension tax relief system should then be simplified and targeted at those who most need help 
building private pensions. In particular, the money would be better directed at financing state-
funded carer credits automatically paid into the carer’s private pension on a similar basis to the carer 
credits that protect state pension accumulation. The aim would be to ensure that the combined 
state and private pension would offer a good chance to achieve the minimum adequate retirement 
income (currently estimated at £277 a week47).  
 
 
46 See, for example,West, J. (2019) Hospital doctors and the pensions trap https://www.hcsa.com/hcsa-journal/hospital-consultant-
specialist-spring-2019/2019/05/hospital-doctors-and-the-pensions-trap.aspx. 
47 https://www.minimumincome.org.uk/. Op cit. 
